The new US-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed on May 24 this year is quite often subject to criticism. There are statements that the Treaty will bring the signatories, i.e. Russia and the U.S., to an unequal position, that the United States will profit much more by the Treaty. Russian negotiators are blamed for unjustified "geopolitical" concessions and so on. The extremely brief form of the new Treaty is also criticized.

    It is true that the new Treaty is uncustomarily brief and rather stingy with technical details. However one can state that it represents a significant event in current Russian-American strategic relationship.

    First of all, one should have a clear understanding that Russian strategic nuclear forces are going through a very difficult period; not this is only due to economical problems and the Russian General Staff's position, but also due to the natural aging of systems in the years the Treaty is planned to be in force. Under such conditions it would have been easier for the U.S. to go on without any other agreement. It could have remained in the framework of the START Treaty (START I) (which is to be valid till the next decade), keeping the strategic forces at a level of 6000 deployed nuclear warheads. However, under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions the United States is ready to reduce its deployed nuclear forces to a level approximately three times lower than the current one (in compliance with START I) and thus committing to have approximately as much strategic offensive arms on active service as Russia will actually have. So the point is that by reducing its strategic weapons, Russia binds the American party with certain commitments on reductions. In other words, Russian diplomacy and Russian negotiators succeeded in keeping the American party within the channel of mutual strategic nuclear weapons reductions. This is the main point.

    Then, it is essential that the Treaty is legally binding; that extends beyond the initial American perception of a "new agreement" as merely a statement of intentions of the two Presidents. It is not only the result of persistent and diligent work of Russian diplomacy. It is the result of the American party's realization of the unalterable fact that disarmament agreements in this vitally important sphere cannot be achieved by "simple handshake" of the state leaders. The agreement should be fixed in the document, be legally binding and verifiable. And therefore the obligations should be observed. The transformation of the current American Administration disarmament philosophy and its return to settled negotiation standards are also important parameters of the new Treaty.

    The new Treaty has another positive feature, as it does not impose limitations on the structure of strategic forces of the parties and on the availability of ground-based missiles with reentry vehicles in particular. This feature probably gives an advantage to the Russian party as it enables Russia to take measures to counteract the missile defense system, which is currently under development in the U.S., should Russia decide to do so.

    Some critics of the Treaty say that the reductions the U.S. is ready to undertake are reversible as removed nuclear warheads are not going to be eliminated and - which is more important - the principally "released" places on strategic delivery vehicles could be "preserved" after the reductions. Eventually the so-called "reconstitution potential" appears and the USA will be able to restore (even partially) warheads to downloaded missiles. The new Treaty does not prohibit both parties from doing so. However the Russian party will not be able to take advantage of the "reconstitution potential" to the extent the American party will due to the actual state of its strategic delivery systems.

    It's worth noting that previous treaties on strategic offensive arms reductions didn't regulate the elimination of warheads; they also allowed availability of the so-called "reconstitution potential". Actually, START II ratified by Russia allowed a significant level of "reconstitution potential". The START Treaty was the breakthrough in nuclear threat reduction and the parties have been complying with it for seven years regardless of the fact that it assumes the "reconstitution potential" availability either.

    For the present, of course, preservation of "reconstitution potential" is characteristic of the treaties on strategic offensive arms reductions. However, it is natural enough that there is a big difference in significance of "reconstitution potential" and "operationally deployed potential". First, the size of the "reconstitution potential" will depend not only on the total quantity of nuclear weapons in the stockpile but also on the quantity of "warhead sockets" on strategic delivery vehicles available. One can suppose with good reason that while the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the START Treaty are still in effect the USA will have fewer "warhead sockets" than the total quantity of nuclear weapons in the stockpile.

    Second, restoration of "reconstitution potential" takes time - weeks or even months. Realization of confidence building measures on de-alerting strategic weapons would have taken approximately the same time. Third, verification measures including on-site inspections can provide certain transparency regarding "reconstitution potential".

    The very title of the Treaty - "the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions" - assumes further discussion not only on reduction of nuclear warheads but generally on scientific-technical aspects of strategic stability. Obviously, the Russian party will give attention to the problem of "reconstitution potential" in future negotiations. The Bilateral Implementation Commission established according to the Treaty certainly will deal with this problem and hopefully will set additional barriers to "reconstitution potential", including both restriction and verification.

    One should note that the United States needs alliance with Russia as a Eurasian country since the relations between the U.S. and some Asian nations (and the Islamic world on the whole) are rather tense. The U.S. needs such a Treaty and it needs friendly and allied Russia joining the new Russia-NATO Council. The new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions disciplines the leading nuclear powers. It sets an example for other nuclear states and helps to involve them in multilateral nuclear disarmament process. It takes into account the commitment of the nations - the NPT participants to conduct negotiations on effective measures of arms race cease and disarmament. Taking all this into account, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in general promotes predictability and strategic stability in the world.

    We welcome it!