On 1 December some representatives of the 'Russian Unity' broke the news at a press-conference about a 'frightful' document which threatened the country with many misfortunes - the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the USA on Safe and Reliable Transportation, Storage and Elimination of Weapons and on the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, signed by President Yeltsin and President Bush in June 1992. The Congress authorised Parliament to analyse the document. What kind of a document it is, what it is signed for and whether it is dangerous for our country - that is what the Minister will exclusively tell the readers of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta about.

    In November 1991 the US Congress made a decision to render technical assistance and free aid to Russia worth US$400 million (at the expense of the budget of the US Department of Energy) for ensuring the safe storage, transportation and elimination of Russian weapons of mass destruction, subject to reduction within the scope of reciprocal initiatives of the Presidents of Russia and USA.

    The elimination of dozens of thousands of warheads is a very expensive operation. It requires US$1-1.5 million. The Russian treasury does not have such money.

    The US Congress required that the American expenses should be compensated with Russian oil and gas or other strategic materials, and put forward six conditions. Two the these conditions - control of the US side over our defence research and development to keep them within the limits of 'defence sufficiency' of Russia, in the US understanding I should say; and control of their specialists over the process of nuclear disarmament in Russia - proved to be absolutely unacceptable, as well as the conditions of compensation. It should be exactly a matter of free aid.

    Therefore, close work on the agreement began. The American side had to be convinced that an ill-prepared elimination of nuclear warheads, related to their dismantlement and transportation, in a situation of political and economic instability in Russia would be dangerous for the USA and for the whole world. Secondly, the USA had to be convinced that, should the financial and technical difficulties suspend the elimination of nuclear weapons in our countries, then the USA would eliminate its nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and we would not have had enough time to do that. They would have 10,000 warheads and we 35,000. In short, the provision of free aid and technical assistance to Russia directly serves the interests of the USA.

    The final draft of the agreement emerged after the summit of B. Yeltsin and G. Bush in June. From our side, the agreement was prepared by the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry for Atomic Energy (the last is entrusted with executive functions). The agreement is based on the Vienna Convention on the Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

    This is a general - 'framework' - agreement. It clearly defines the criteria for rendering US assistance and stipulates a necessity of additional agreements to regulate specific forms and mechanisms of interactions between Russia and the USA. The Ministry of Defence and Minatom have already signed five such documents.

    Are there any provisions in the 'framework' agreement which can be viewed as a betrayal of the interests of Russia? It elaborates on the principal aspects: for instance, the procedure of reliable transportation of warheads to the site of dismantlement, and storage procedure. The American side provides us with technical assistance in all these areas, and this assumes participation of US specialists. It is logical to grant them certain privileges in terms of entry to and exit from the country and visits to our facilities. It does not mean that they can have a fancy life in Russia, to bring in or bring out whatever they want. The favourable treatment covers only the areas under the agreement. In addition, the invited specialists will have the status of advisers. We are the decision makers and we rigorously control all the deliveries. The Russian side and exclusively the Russian side is responsible for all operations with the American equipment.

    In our turn, we shall guarantee to the American side that all the equipment received will be used only for the designated purposes, that it will not be found somewhere in the third world and that it will not serve the purpose of weapons manufacture. The above explains the complicated and long procedure of the termination of the agreement.

    Generally, I should say that the agreement marks a new approach to the problems of disarmament and collective security. From our side such an assistance should only be welcomed. What is the scope of the assistance? Under five specific agreements the USA will supply 450 sets of soft cover to protect the warheads from being pierced in case of sabotage; 200 sets for fast response teams which operate in different emergencies; 115 sets of equipment for special railroad cars. The last alone is worth US$20 million. Now you should add 10,000 containers for storing uranium and plutonium - US$5000-6000 each, as well as equipment for modem storage facilities of fissile materials. Under the agreement we will not receive a single 'live' cent - only hardware or designs. Under the above-mentioned five agreements the assistance will be worth US$100 million and this, let's say, will constitute 500 billion roubles. Incidentally, in this financial year we received from the state budget 20 billion roubles for all research and development aimed at maintaining the capability of the nuclear weapons complex.

    So where is the damage to Russia? Where is the betrayal of the interests of Russia? And who is blamed in the betrayal? The people who gave all their strength to the creation of the nuclear shield of the country? Besides, a purely formal general 'framework' agreement does not give ground for such accusations. Should we consider the agreement in the complex with specific additional projects, the absurdity of the accusations becomes obvious.

    The negotiations for safe elimination of nuclear weapons and prevention of their proliferation are being currently conducted with England, France, FRG and Italy. All countries of the world should be interested in a reliable reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Interview by Eugeny Panov.

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