Naturally, it is very difficult to expound in one article all complex and contradictory aspects of military and political, social and economic as well as scientific problems of nuclear weapons in our country in the present world environment.

    I stated my ideas and my approach relying on thirty-odd years of work in the industry when every year I spent two or three months on the nuclear test sites, excluding the last three years when I was appointed a deputy minister.

    But I am convinced of one thing: despite the complicated contradictions in our society, nothing will impede a striving to move ahead along the road of progress. And nuclear weapons will keep on protecting a free choice of this way for a long time onwards, the way which our people have deserved.

    A new stage in natural sciences which began in the end of the last century with a number of major discoveries, such as radioactivity, atomic and nuclear structures, led to a radical break-up of the previous ideas about the structure and properties of matter, space and time.

    The practical results of the revolution in physics are the greatest achievements of the human mind of the twentieth century and have triggered a tremendous growth of productive forces.

    The development of atomic (nuclear) energy of the fission of heavy atoms and synthesis of light nuclei is one of the fundamental practical results of this stage. The feasibility of a nuclear fission chain reaction is the most remarkable and fundamental property of matter. This phenomenon can be used for initiating both a chain explosion - an avalanche-like release of nuclear energy - and a stationary and controlled fission reaction in a nuclear reactor.

    The world's first nuclear power plant (NPP) of 5000 kW (e) capacity was commissioned on 27 June 1954 in Obninsk near Moscow. Prior to this event, a great discovery of our century -the energy of the atomic nucleus - was associated in the minds of millions of people only with military applications. Today, the NPPs account for about 16% of the world's total electricity production. And this share keeps on growing.

    Nuclear power is, on the one hand, the only source of electric power which can satisfy long-term energy requirements of mankind and contributes neither to the greenhouse effect, nor to acid rain. On the other hand, nuclear power is not inherently safe for human beings and the environment. A danger of global radioactive contamination of the environment can arise as a result of a damage of nuclear reactors in an accident or an ordinary military conflict.

First Tests

    The first nuclear weapon test in history was conducted by the USA on 16 July 1945 in the state of New Mexico three weeks prior to the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bombardment of the defenceless Japanese cities was a blunt demonstration of the military power of the United States to the whole world. All of us were seized by the feeling of being unprotected and of great concern for the future of our nations.

    Since their advent, the Soviet Union has consistently pursued the policy of total ban on nuclear weapons. In 1946, after the victory over fascism, the Soviet Government proposed in the UN to prohibit nuclear weapons. However, such formulation of the problem disagreed with the vital interests of the United States owing to the availability of their nuclear weapons capability and their intention to maintain their atomic monopoly. Our political initiative was rejected. The official US policy of 'balancing on the verge of war' in that period was a real military threat for our country rather than a mythical one as some persons try to present it today.

    29 August 1949, in the face of the US nuclear monopoly, the Soviet Union conducted its first test of an atomic bomb on the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

    In 1952 Great Britain detonated its first nuclear device; in 1960 France; in 1964 China. The annual number of nuclear tests began to grow.

    Nuclear physics began to arise in our country in the pre-war years. The Leningrad Physical and Technical Institute and its director, Academician A. F. Joffe, made an extraordinarily high contribution to the pre-war period and to the training of highly skilled personnel in this area of knowledge. Among employees of the Physical and Technical Institute a special note should be taken of such outstanding scientists as academician I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton, N. N. Semenov and A. P. Aleksandrov.

    Later, a number of distinguished scientists of our country -LE.Tamm, L.D. Landau, A. N. Tikhonov, LM.Gelfund, M.V. Keldysh, Ya. B. Zeidovich and D. A. Frunk-Kamenetski, who brought up a galaxy of prominent scientists - joined the atomic bomb project.

    In addition, a tremendous industrial potential was required for developing atomic energy. The Soviet industry has proved its capability to establish a series of new, extremely complex and high-tech installations, which constitute the kernel of nuclear industry now, in the shortest possible time. B. L. Vannikov, P.M.Zemov, B. G.Mazrukov, E.P.Slavski, N.L.Dukhov and K. I. Tshelkin were the outstanding organisers and engineers in this industry.

    A new industry was set up during the difficult war and post-war years. What made the physicists, designers, and organisers work selflessly from early morning till late at night on the establishment of the atomic industry? I think that, on the one hand, it was primarily their love of our Motherland, genuine patriotism and, on the other hand, their natural intention to display the intellect and talent of Man. I believe that it is precisely this combination of state and personal interests that constitutes genuine universal values, irrespective of an era or a country. Unfortunately, nowadays they are very often replaced with a 'chase after a big pay-packet' at any cost.

    As far back as 1943, after the receipt of the information from, K. Fuchs, a German physicist-communist, about a wide-scale deployment of works in that area in the USA, the Government authorised Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov to head the first atomic scientific centre and all operations on the atomic project. In August 1945 an Interdepartmental Governmental body was set up to coordinate all works related to the establishment of atomic science and technology - the First Main Department under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

    The early 1950s were remarkable for the development of thermonuclear weapons ('H-bomb') which are based on thermonuclear fusion of light nuclei (deuterium and tritium). This fact was confirmed by the US nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1952-4, when the yield of one of the thermonuclear devices was equivalent to 16 million tons of TNT, as well as by our tests of practically combat versions of the H-bomb in 1953 and 1955. An exceptional contribution to the development of the Soviet H-bomb was made by a prominent physicist, academician A. D. Sakharov - the father of the hydrogen bomb.

    Our tests were conducted practically simultaneously with the American ones and were of extreme importance for national security of the Soviet Union and global stability. They completely ruined the nuclear weapons monopoly of the United States.

    The development of atomic and hydrogen bombs marked a new stage in the history of mankind, posing a number of important philosophical and world-view problems which were unknown to society before and raising the level of responsibility of the politicians for the global existence of life itself on our planet.

    The mastering of the energy of nuclear reactions by mankind raised a large number of diverse and ambiguous problems. The most important result is however unquestionable - mankind has entered a new historical era of solving military conflicts. This is the strong side of perestroyka - it has timely detected and clearly identified the principal attributes of the new era in the evolution of mankind.

    Atomic professionals have pretty well realised and keep on realising their responsibility to society and nations for preserving peace on our planet and for excluding the repetition of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    The Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR ('Sred-mash') was set up in 1953 to direct the new branch of science and technology and in 1989 it was transformed in the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of the USSR. From the very beginning this industry was based on the scientific and technical potential and powerful production base, i.e. it represented a new type of research and production complex.

Signal of Hope

    The development of nuclear weapons is inextricably connected with full-scale nuclear tests.

    Nuclear testing explosions are conducted to design and improve nuclear weapons, to verify theoretical calculations of the circuits of a nuclear device equipment. In addition, the sensitivity of warhead design necessitates systematic tests of the weapons in stock.

    However, from the very beginning nuclear weapon tests produced and continue to produce a negative impact on many aspects of international life, the health and well-being of millions of people. Nuclear explosions, especially atmospheric and surface explosions, were finally increasing the total radioactivity of the environment, irrespective of the testing country. The Soviet Union resolutely took a stand in the vanguard of forces advocating a ban on all tests of nuclear weapons as the first step on the way towards the termination of the nuclear arms race, on the way towards a nuclear-free world. The Soviet Union made such a statement already in November 1955 at the 10th UN General Assembly. In July 1956 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a special resolution which stated that 'advocating a complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union attributes a great importance to the conclusion of a separate agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon explosions'.

    And here are some milestones in the history of political negotiations for the limitation of nuclear testing.

    Owing to great efforts of the Soviet Union, in 1963 the USSR, USA and Great Britain signed in Moscow the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water'. By the present time over 115 countries adhere to the Treaty. The Moscow Treaty was a decisive step towards an improvement and normalisation of the ecological situation on our planet. As far back as March 1964 the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences published a special statement which indicated that since the conclusion of the Treaty total radioactivity of fallouts from air and surface explosions had decreased manyfold as compared with the period when they were conducted. Transfer to underground nuclear weapon tests decreased the radioactive after-effects of a nuclear test a hundred thousand times. The whole world welcomed this step.

    After the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, our country continued persistently the struggle for a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. As a result, eleven years later the USSR and USA signed, also in Moscow, the 'Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests' which established the yield threshold of 150-kilotons of TNT equivalent. However, the USA did not ratify the Threshold Treaty of 1974 for more than sixteen years owing to its stand on the issue of verification means.

    In 1990 the Presidents of the USSR and USA signed the Protocol to the Treaty of 1974 and the sides ratified the Treaty and the Protocol.

    It is worth paying attention to the fact that in September 1990 the US Senate approved the ratification of the Threshold Treaty, subject to the implementation of efficient and continuous programmes of underground nuclear weapon tests and to the preservation of modem nuclear laboratories and programmes ensuring continuous progress in nuclear engineering.

    It took only three years of bilateral negotiations in Geneva to elaborate the Protocol which is an unprecedented document in terms of the depth and scope of technical verification procedures. In this connection it is worth noting that the initial Protocol to the Threshold Treaty covered only national technical verification means, therefore it was open for signing by other sides, while the new Protocol which includes the hydrodynamic yield measuring method on the site of explosion is practically doomed to remain bilateral. It cannot but worry us, taking into account nuclear weapon tests conducted by other countries, primarily by France and China. Nevertheless, a major political step was made towards the limitation of nuclear weapons, and primarily it became possible owing to the new political mentality. The most important outcome of these governmental negotiations is the openness of the professional discussions of numerous scientific problems and mutual understanding of the scientific and technical aspects of verification of the compliance with the treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapon tests. It is very important today to continue the governmental dialogue which has already started on the limitation of nuclear tests.

    An unprecedented Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) which was carried out in 1988 made a basic contribution to the progress in the Geneva negotiations. Nuclear explosions were conducted on the Nevada and Semipalatinsk Test Sites within the scope of the above experiment. For the first time in the history of two countries many technical aspects of explosion yield verification methods were jointly evaluated on two nuclear test sites, and, what is more important, the tests included the anti-intrusive techniques of the hydrodynamic yield measuring method which excluded the acquisition of information about nuclear weapon design in the course of verification. Joint development of anti-intrusive devices and systems for the purposes of the Threshold Treaty, which is near completion now, is another vivid example of the contribution of the scientists of two countries to the solution of the political problem of the limitation of nuclear weapon tests and to the enhancement of trust between our countries.

    Those two explosions were really a signal of hope on the way towards a nuclear-free world! I have not met a nuclear weapons professional who would not welcome these steps, being fully conscious of a powerful destructive force of the stockpiled nuclear weapons. By the way, this event has been left practically unnoticed in the mass media of our country in contrast to the noisy campaigns of public organisations, especially those with the participation of foreign guests.

    Further progress in the limitation of nuclear weapon tests completely depends on the position of the United States in this issue because there are all prerequisites for expanding, without delays, the achieved success and, primarily, in the area of the numerical reduction of annual nuclear weapon tests, including those whose TNT equivalent is up to 150 kilotons. The transfers to a numerical limitation of tests is a qualitatively new step which, first of all, necessitates the definition of the notion of a minimum TNT equivalent of the threshold of a genuine nuclear explosion, taking into account technical verification capability, i.e. the definition of the term 'nuclear explosion'.

    The mechanism of verifying the number of nuclear tests can be implemented, and that is very important, on a wide international basis via the transformation of the national verification means into international and on-site inspections.

    While pursuing this way, I believe it is important to reach an international agreement on the criteria of the safe conduct of underground nuclear tests and on verification of the compliance with such criteria on and off nuclear tests sites.

    The cessation of all nuclear tests is at present of principal importance and is aimed at preventing the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons - the so called directed energy weapons - and at preventing the release of an evil 'jinn' from the research stage to a full-scale development stage at a new spiral in the arms race. These weapons feature qualitatively new safety parameters in the time of peace, and target killing efficiency and reliability in the time of war. On the one hand, these weapons should produce a hundred times lower global radioactive contamination as compared with the existing weapons and, on the other hand, they should be capable of killing the strategic targets of an adversary in outer space and on earth. This is precisely the fact of principal concern because some hotheads might be tempted into using them in any local conflict. And we should not exclude a possibility that the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons would become a step from the policy of 'deterrent' towards the policy of 'intimidation'.

    In this connection, there are apprehensions that the second generation of nuclear weapons might be eliminated under the strictest international control on the basis of relevant agreements but in line with a progress of the West in the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons.

    Today, nuclear weapons are primarily a means for maintaining global political, military and economic stability on our planet, no matter whether the nuclear weapon states are opposing each other in some areas or not.

    The only alternative to the nuclear balance and deterrent strategy is a regime of complete trust and openness, universal and complete ban on nuclear weapons testing and development. This is our objective. Striving for this goal, we should pursue any paths: official and people's diplomacy, including the 'green' movement, cultural and scientific exchanges, expansion of trade, joint ventures, etc. In doing so, we should seek international agreements on stage-by-stage maximum possible numerical reduction of nuclear weapons. It is important to distinguish such types of nuclear weapons which inherently trigger mistrust or aggressiveness.

    Unfortunately, until all measure to eliminate nuclear weapons and to prevent a possibility of their development in any country of the world yield a tangible result, our Commonwealth will have to maintain its defence sufficiency.

In the Future - Together

    Taking into account a unique historic situation, there is an opportunity to strengthen the universal collective security system in the near future through the joint efforts of a number of countries.

    At the present time, despite new mutual understanding and large-scale efforts to enhance cooperation, the world has a real huge military machine which is a direct material threat rather than a hypothetical one. The extent and nature of external military threats change with time, but the level of the Commonwealth's security must be adequate to meet the existing world reality at every stage.

    However, peremptory statements of public figures over the radio, television, in the press and from rostra of the Supreme Soviets; at the meetings and rallies of various public organisations on a complete ban on nuclear weapon testing in our country, shape a public opinion about the necessity of further unilateral steps.

    There is no doubt that a majority of the authors most sincerely intend to save mankind from a nuclear disaster. However, in our country the centre of the struggle for complete nuclear disarmament has harshly shifted recently to the struggle for actual unilateral nuclear disarmament. After all, taking into account all after-effects of the use of nuclear weapons, they are primarily a means of global policies at the present time. The voice of professionals is drowned in a chorus of public interpreters of the issues in an area where competence and caution are of special importance. The mass media do not actually give the floor to the professionals and experts, and very often obvious libel, inventions and demagogic speeches are left unanswered. Erroneous opinions are passed off as facts and impacts of ecological factors which are not related to radiation are interpreted as radiation effects.

    Incidentally, the Soviet journalists did not arrive at the JVE explosion in Nevada, though they had been officially invited. There is a situation in our country when any criticism in the address of Soviet nuclear weapons and nuclear test sites is considered to be patriotic and progressive. And, as it always happens in such cases, a number of public figures use this situation to raise their popularity, very often playing the role of a director and script writer of mass action.

    All of us strive to put our house in order, however, and not everything is going smoothly so far. There are a lot of examples at every turn. We are not alone on the planet; we all live in a complex and dynamic world. In the age of nuclear and space technology, space and time are utmost compressed for everyone.

    There are still a lot of regions in the world with unstable political situations, extremism and aggressiveness, including those in the vicinity of our borders. Certain third world countries are intensively developing nuclear weapons. Therefore the nuclear weapons capability which was established in the times of difficulty for our country, and its continuous maintenance at a modem scientific and technical level, are a guarantee of a stable peace on our planet.

    While reducing nuclear weapons, we can save immeasurably more resources for the needs of national economy than we would with a unilateral ban on nuclear weapons testing - the basis of scientific, technical and military potential of our country - until we achieve a universal ban on nuclear weapons testing. It should be emphasised that, notwithstanding the importance of the implementation of unilateral disarmament measures, it is extremely important not to make that very last step, beyond which is an abyss and irreversible processes. It is much more difficult to prevent the degradation of unique teams of highly skilled professionals than to destroy everything. It is much simpler now, taking into account our most complex social and economic situation, to require that our country should take new and new unilateral steps. Were the post-war years, when the nuclear industry was set up, really easier for us? And to-day, speaking frankly, a high civil courage is required to preserve, in spite of the existing situation in our country around nuclear laboratories and nuclear test sites, a high sense of responsibility and patriotism and to overcome the temptation of a momentary benefit for the teams of scientists, engineers and workers, while solving the problems of maintaining the nuclear capability at all stages of disarmament. The transfer to the principle of defence sufficiency is now closely related to the reorientation of the entire Soviet military industrial capability to qualitatively new parameters of the armaments, relying on the achievements of modem science and technology.

    The processes of bilateral disarmament, where a considerable progress has been achieved under perestroyka, are natural in terms of the implementation of the concept of reasonable defence sufficiency of the country. Of prime importance are the first steps towards nuclear disarmament: the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, INF Treaty, and the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Arms, START.

A mysterious Professor 'M' - who is he? (1)
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    In late September 1991 and late January 1992 Washington announced large-scale reductions of the US nuclear forces. I am convinced that these steps of President Bush will be supported by our people and the leadership of the country because they convey the essence of perestroyka policy. The retaliatory steps and counter proposals of our country and President Yeltsin concentrated our efforts undertaken during perestroyka on the way towards a new world. These are the results of the new political mentality in the nuclear age.

    In this time when two major nuclear powers agree to the reduction of nuclear arsenals, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should become a factor of prime importance on the way towards a nuclear-free world. Within the scope of the Treaty of 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreements of 1974 and 1984 and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials of 1987, it is appropriate to develop national measures of control over relevant supplies and technologies in the renovated Commonwealth, maintaining the integrity of the nuclear weapons complex of Russia as a national property of the people for ensuring a competent solution of the above aspects of military-political problems as well. Russia should become the only nuclear weapon state and successor of the former Soviet Union. One nuclear power, as it used to be, and not two or three - it meets the aspirations of genuine fighters for a nuclear-free world.

A mysterious Professor 'M' - who is he? (2)
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    In 1946 a national laboratory, the so-called Laboratory No. 2, was set up to develop nuclear weapons, and General P. M. Zemov, a talented engineer, was assigned as its first director. Nowadays, this laboratory is the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics located on the border of Nyzhni Novgorod Region and Mordovian Republic and is essentially a city with 100,000 inhabitants.

    Our second national 'laboratory' involved in the development of nuclear weapons was established on the bank of Lake Sinara in the Chelyabinsk Region in 1955; D. E. Vasilyev, a prominent engineer, was its first director. The city and the institute - the All-Union Institute of Technical Physics - were built simultaneously.

    In a relatively short period these institutes have grown into major scientific centres of the country. They are, in fact, large research and production centres where research, development and manufacture are united in an inseparably integrated cycle; where unique experimental, calculation and manufacturing bases are set up. The activities of these two institutes played a decisive role in assuring the balance of nuclear arms of the USSR and USA, and recently - during the bilateral negotiations for the elaboration of the measures to verify the compliance - with the agreements on nuclear tests as well. The potential of these institutes enables solutions of major problems of scientific and technical support of nuclear disarmament, subject to defence sufficiency at every stage of disarmament.

    The share of nonmilitary R&D in these institutes is about 25% and shows an upward trend. Some of these R&D results are widely used in the national economy.

Special Regime

    The best specialists of the country were selected for work in these institutes. I can tell you frankly that life in these cities was difficult owing to a special regime of access to relatives and near ones. We all put up with it because the work was all important. The defence of the frontiers of our Motherland has always been considered to be one of the most glorious traditions of our people. But nowadays, for their rationing coupons these fabulous heroes can hardly buy matches, salt and other commodities which are so badly needed for ensuring a subsistence minimum. One in five of the institute's staff is on the waiting list to get an apartment. An average monthly salary in these institutes was about 450 roubles in 1991 while the salary one in seven of the employees was 250 roubles a month which is lower than the living subsistence wage. An increase of salaries by a factor of 1.9, starting with January 1992, will not solve the problem of their existence under conditions of free-market prices. Bearing in mind the especially difficult working conditions which are very often associated with a risk for human life, as well as the difficult conditions of everyday life in the closed cities, one can imagine the extent of despair of these people, their cry from the heart. Last January the leading scientists met with President Yeltsin in the Kremlin. We have awaited such a meeting for all the years of perestroyka. B. N. Yeltsin spared us a whole working day in this complex and difficult time for Russia. A very circumstantial conversation took place, covering all the aspects of the nuclear weapons complex. I was very pleased with this meeting and the concern displayed for our workers.

    The development of nuclear weapons requires the participation of prominent scientists. An outstanding scientist would not stay in a closed city unless adequate living and working conditions were established. Besides, young people would not agree nowadays to work under such living conditions. The average age of the technical personnel of the VNIIEF is currently forty-four years, and in the Institute as a whole, forty-two.

    It should be particularly emphasised that the specimens of nuclear weapons which are developed and manufactured for delivery to a nuclear test site, naturally are sources of danger. Therefore it is extremely important to limit the access of irrelevant people to the closed cities.

    The situation in the development, improvement and maintenance of combat effectiveness of nuclear weapons has recently and sharply become more complicated in our country. Financial and logistics support of our weapons institutes has abruptly deteriorated to such an extent that it called into question the feasibility of future work on nuclear weapons in our country, including the improvement of their safety. The development of the experimental, testing and manufacturing base is actually terminated; almost no resources are allocated to replace obsolete equipment; housing construction is significantly curtailed.

    Thus, the actual R&D expenditure of the national laboratories decreased by 40% in 1991 as compared with 1990 owing to reduction in finance and increase in cost of materials, components as well as social welfare. It is already 1992 but the problem of finance for this year is not yet solved. The most skilled and active scientists, designers and workers have to terminate their weapons activity and to go to cooperatives and small enterprises, losing their scientific and professional skills.

    A visit of President Yeltsin to Arzamas-16 in late March was of extreme importance in this situation. A leader of our country visited the weapons specialists for the first time in the history of this national nuclear centre. A detailed and business-like discussion took place on how to maintain the scientific and technical potential of the sector under conversion of the defence industries.

    Over 100,000 people are currently working in the nuclear weapons complex of the country, which comprises nuclear fuel production plants, nuclear warhead manufacture plants and research institutes; the population of the cities, which are closed for security and secrecy reasons, exceeds 500,000 inhabitants. The entire complex is located in Russia. The fixed assets of these enterprises, which have been accumulated for forty years, amount to approximately 4 billion roubles. Their depreciation now exceeds 50%. According to our estimates, the cost of the fixed assets of a similar complex of the US Department of Energy constitutes now over US$15 billion, the number of the employees being comparatively close. For the next 20-25 years the Americans are intending to renovate their nuclear weapons complex, envisaging in this case a significant finance (up to one third of the total expenses) for health care of the employees and environmental protection. One of the principal targets of the US Administration is a qualitative improvement and modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex as the basis of military-strategic potential for successful implementation of the programme of strategic defence initiative (SDI) and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. In this situation nuclear weapons will naturally remain the basis of national security of our country and the world as a whole. Today, I am convinced that mutual understanding between the USSR and USA is the basis of stability in the world and shapes their economic relations.

    The world community is currently undertaking serious efforts to cease the militarisation and to demilitarise the world community in the future; however, the world we are living in now is completely militarised.

    In 1990 we elaborated a concept of evolution and modernisation of the enterprises involved in the development, testing and manufacture of nuclear warheads up to the year 2010. The total capital investments in this programme would amount to approximately 0.7 billion roubles. Under an actual reduction of nuclear weapons, this concept pays special attention to a qualitative backfitting of the institutes and plants, taking into account the growing conversion of defence production. The fixed assets of the enterprises do not correspond to the modem technological and environmental requirements on new concepts of safety assurance in manufacture, storage and transportation of nuclear materials. This twenty year programme envisages, among other things, expenditure for enhancing personnel safety, environmental protection and radwaste disposal - 3 billion roubles; for improving the computing capability of the enterprises where we are well behind the USA - 3 billion roubles; for renovating the experimental-diagnostic base - 2 billion roubles; for moth-balling the available plutonium and tritium production reactors - 1 billion roubles; for setting up a storage facility to accommodate radioactive materials recovered from dismantled and eliminated nuclear warheads - 1 billion roubles. The implementation of this programme will allow us to respond flexibly to the trends of the world community in the area of disarmament and to enhance the technological level of conversion projects.

    We have stopped the production of weapons-grade uranium. All 13 fresh plutonium production reactors will be eliminated by the year 2000 (4 plutonium production reactors are in operation now and only 2 reactors will be in operation by 1996).

    The modernisation concept envisages the budgetary finance of the modernisation and development of the enterprises, taking into account an increase of the share of conversion projects up to 60% by the year 2000, including the projects of ecological rehabilitation of contaminated territories; development of fibre-optical TV and communication systems; development of radioisotope and nuclear medicine; design of ultra strong tools and high-precision machine tools for machining intricate-shape structures; creation of new composite materials; production of mobile environmental monitoring and analysis laboratories; production of advanced special-purity materials, etc. Several research and production associations have already been set up in some of these areas, and I think that the establishment of joint stock companies is on the agenda now.

    At the present time, on average about 30% of the research and production capacities of the nuclear weapons complex is already working to satisfy the needs of the national economy of the country, including around 5% of production capacities directly involved in the manufacture of consumer goods. There are plans to double the output of consumer goods by the year 1995. In doing so, we are intending to produce commodities which are in the shortest supply and high-tech products, such as digital video and audio recorders, laser players and disks, microwave ovens and electronic locks, and many other goods in high demand. This area also needs centralised state investments. The centralised coordination of the conversion projects in the nuclear weapons complex is one of the basic conditions for ensuring nonproliferation of the technologies developed in the complex - this is a major and very sensitive problem for the state. Attraction of foreign capital investments will also govern in many respects the success of this conversion programme and the time of its implementation.

    The current expenses for the maintenance of the nuclear weapons complex were 10 roubles from each compatriot. Only 10 roubles a year! This is the payment for our independence and our dignity. Everyone was giving less than one rouble a month to maintain the nuclear capability of the country.

    I think that not only should this pride of the country be supported materially but also that their working and living conditions should be protected. Then the return from these teams for all spheres of activity in the country, for the defence and for national economy, will surpass all expectations. These teams have obtained the scientific and technical results which satisfy the best world standards, owing to the high qualification and selfless labour of scientists, designers and workers, and to the precise and efficient organisation of work, high labour and technological discipline of these teams. It is precisely today's state support of such complexes, the rational utilisation of scientific potential and the fixed assets of the enterprises, that will ensure scientific and technical progress of the country in the future.

    Nowadays, there is no future for the country and for the nation without scientific and technical progress!

Security of the Planet

    Admitting officially today that a nuclear war would lead to a disaster and that it should be prevented, the new US doctrine of 'containment' applies great importance to the improvement of its nuclear arsenal.

    It should be noted that the West has not yet officially renounced the first use of nuclear weapons and continues to improve its nuclear forces, using advantages in technology and in the priority attitude to the development of nuclear warheads for strategic offensive arms, including missile complexes with individually guided warheads whose delivery accuracy is 100m and which can kill highly protected targets.

    The defence sufficiency doctrine, assumed international commitments to reduce nuclear arsenal and the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons have an impact on the composition of nuclear weapons and require their qualitative improvement.

    The physicists-designers have always paid special attention to the problems of nuclear weapon safety during manufacture, storage and transportation as well as scheduled maintenance and primarily through the development of such physical circuits of nuclear weapon designs which would in principle exclude a nuclear explosion in any nonstandard situation.

    Safety enhancement is currently a priority objective of the nuclear weapons programme. The technical achievements allowed the introduction of great safety improvements in the nuclear weapon design after its development.

    Since the effects of any accident or premeditated seizure of a nuclear weapon are extremely dangerous in a political and physical sense, every available measure has always been taken to protect nuclear weapons against an unauthorised nuclear explosion of a hazardous scattering of radioactive substances.

    However, such questions related to nuclear weapons as 'How safe is safety?' and 'What kind of a compromise should be reached between the combat performance and further improvement of safety?' are extremely complex. The safety problem has always been solved proceeding from the military-political doctrine. The modem world is changing and the main emphasis is shifting towards safety.

    It is worth emphasising an extreme complexity of the safety problem of nuclear weapon complexes and the necessity of 3D modelling and analysis which require a complete approximation to the nuclear explosion.

    The nuclear warhead is a sophisticated and, I would say, a unique technical device which integrates modem electronic devices and generators, nuclear materials and conventional explosives. Control commands automatically synchronise the operation of these devices in time up to several tens of nanoseconds. Naturally, the service life of such devices is limited in time like that of any other complex electronic equipment.

    The designer of nuclear weapons has to deal with their actual 3D geometry. At the present time, the performance of our state-of-the-art super computers does not describe the development of all hydrodynamic and neutron processes precisely enough.

    Moreover, during a nuclear explosion one has to deal with substance temperatures of the order of several hundred million degrees and pressures of several million atmospheres as well as the transfer of heat and neutrons inside the substance in a super rapidly changing geometry within a nanosecond on the background of a fission chain reaction which proceeds at a variable rate.

    Our capability to transfer from 2D models to 3D models is currently several dozens of times lower than that of the US national nuclear laboratories. However, even 3D models do not enable a sufficiently precise description of all sensitive moments of the detonation kinetics of conventional explosives and chain reactions of nuclear fission and fusion.

    We had much lower financial resources and a considerable backwardness of the laboratory and computing bases but were successful in compensating for all these drawbacks through the inventiveness of our scientists and designers and primarily through a roughly comparable number of nuclear tests as the USA - the only method of obtaining experimental information about the physical processes which proceed under the extreme conditions of a nuclear explosion.

    Nuclear tests are an integral part of research and development. It should be noted that the USA, where the Nevada Test Site is under the control of the Department of Energy, spends about US$500 million a year for nuclear tests which is ten times as much as our expenses.

    The USSR conducted nuclear explosions on two test sites of the Ministry of Defence: Semipalatinsk Test Site and Northern Test Site (island of Novaya Zemlya).

    467 tests of nuclear weapons were conducted on the Semipalatinsk Test Site since 1949, including 343 underground tests, and 132 tests on the Northern Test Site since 1955, including 42 underground tests.

    The situation around the activities on the nuclear test sites has become aggravated recently. The perestroyka processes in our country led to a normalisation of the military-political situation in the world and identified the priority of universal values. The antinuclear movement of the world public is growing.

    However, persistent demands to terminate nuclear tests unilat-erally resulted in unpredictability and instability of the status of nuclear tests in our country and in a sharp reduction of our nuclear tests programme for the last six years which brought the nuclear weapons complex to the verge of irreversible processes of its degradation. Physical processes of a nuclear explosion cannot be simulated under laboratory conditions, therefore nuclear weapon tests remain the only way to verify their serviceability, reliability and safety.

    Adhering to the objectives and principles of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests, I believe that in the present situation our underground tests of nuclear weapons can be limited with only a minimum number required. An annual minimum number of nuclear weapon tests should be naturally stipulated in an international or bilateral agreement to provide safeguards against unexpected political or technical developments.

    I would like to remind you that the USA conducted around 9 tests in 1990; France 6 and China 2. Our country conducted only one test, on the Northern Test Site.

    In 1991 the USA conducted 8 nuclear tests on the Nevada Test Site; France 6 tests in the Pacific. Our test sites are silent again! And they will remain silent till the end of 1992 unless the Americans follow the example of our unilateral moratorium. Our test sites will remain practically silent for two years running - 1991 and 1992.

    Following our example, France declared a moratorium last April on nuclear tests till the end of 1992. The USA has the last word and the whole world is expecting this step.

Test Sites and Nuclear Tests

    The problem of nuclear tests impacts scientific aspects so strongly that I can not but dwell upon them in a wider sense.

    In contrast to the Semipalatinsk Test Site, the geographical location and geological structure of the islands of Novaya Zemlya ensure full protection of the population of the regions in the vicinity of the territory of the test site against radiation and the seismic effects of underground nuclear explosions of 150 kiloton yield maximum. Taking into account the seismicity and lack of underground waters, the characteristic features of the geological formations of the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya ensure conditions for a complete localisation of the nuclear explosion products in the depths of the archipelago.

    The remoteness of the test areas of the Novaya Zemlya Test Site from the nearest cities of Amderma, Naryan-Mar, Vorkuta, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk is 250, 400, 500, 900 and 1000 km respectively, while the city of Semipalatinsk is located 90 km away from the Kazakhstan test site and the settlement nearest to the test site, Komsomolski with 10,000 inhabitants, is at a distance of 40 km, i.e. it is in the high-risk zone of the Semipalatinsk Test Site. It is worth recalling that the Nevada Test Site in the USA is located 130 km away from Las Vegas whose population increases to 1 million people during summer vacations; however, the actual distance to the test areas is about 200 km.

    The air and surface nuclear tests have undoubtedly caused damage to the health of the proximate population. People who suffered from the surface and air tests in 1949-62, irrespective of their current place of residence, should be granted the same benefits and privileges as the persons who suffered from the Chemobyl disaster.

    At present, there are separate areas on the surface of the nuclear test sites which were contaminated after the air and surface nuclear explosions, therefore the access to them should be limited.

    The transfer to underground nuclear tests was a cardinal step in terms of ecological situation improvement and the numerical reduction of annual tests.

    It is important to emphasise that, provided there is a sufficient depth of nuclear device emplacement, strong and tight stemming of the emplacement hole in the soil, that there are favourable meteorological conditions during a nuclear explosion and two or three days afterwards and many other organisational and engineering safety measures, nuclear explosion will inflict a minimum ecological damage on the territory of a test site and there will be practically no damage to the off-site population and territory of the country. The territory of a nuclear test site is usually of the order of several thousand square kilometres.

    From the very first days of underground nuclear tests all measures have been taken to prevent practically any release of radioactive products to the surface. The technology of radioactive products confinement had been continuously improved and in 1988 the participants of the USSR-USA joint verification experiment and correspondents had an opportunity to visit the ground zero of a 150 kt explosion 45 minutes after the blast on the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

    Radiation safety of underground nuclear explosions is a complex of technical and organisational measures which ensure the prevention of emergency situations or limitation of their effects as well as the prevention of population exposure doses above the levels of international standards. The JVE confirmed that our general algorithms of actions on the preparation of a specific nuclear test on a test site are similar to the American ones.

    Bearing in mind the mistrust of the world and national public opinion towards the nuclear industry, I think it is appropriate to elaborate the procedures of international or bilateral control over the safety of underground nuclear explosions. There are very sound preconditions in this area for signing an agreement or a treaty on the criteria and procedures of control over underground nuclear explosions.

    Taking into account the above, I believe that within the scope of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests, signed in Moscow in 1974, and the Protocol thereto, signed in Washington in 1990, Kazakhstan and Russia should take a legal commitment, as the CIS member-states:

• to cease nuclear weapon tests on the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan which has carried a major burden of nuclear tests since 1949;
  
  
• to maintain and backfit certain installations on the Northern Test Site with a view of ensuring defence sufficiency of our country and providing safeguards against unanticipated political and technical developments, as well as for ensuring on-site inspections of nuclear tests in compliance with the ratified Treaty of 1974 and Protocol thereto of 1990.

    Taking into account the necessity of maintaining a defence sufficiency of our country, it is proposed to conduct 2-4 nuclear weapon tests a year on the Northern Test Site in the future. On average, we used to conduct up to 2 nuclear tests annually on this test site in 1964-90, and in certain years, up to 3-4 underground tests. Thus, we are talking about a fourfold reduction of our nuclear testing programme, i.e. from an average of 15 tests a year on two test sites of the country to 4 tests. Such a reduction of nuclear tests necessitates, taking into account the requirements for their safety enhancement, the development of new approaches both to nuclear testing itself and to the improvement of diagnostic efficiency of the physical processes of an underground nuclear explosion.

    Incidentally, today one can hear that the idea to continue testing is upheld by those who receive huge salaries and considerable privileges for the tests. Do not trust these words! They are pronounced by the people whose purpose of life is not the service of our Motherland but political capital, wages and privileges. The testers of nuclear weapons have always had only one privilege -to be in the first ranks of those who try to subdue the nuclear elements.