After the life and work under conditions of the test sites -Switzerland! How sharp are the contrasts of life! The time was late 1988. The autumn weather kept fine in Geneva during the USSR-USA bilateral negotiations for the results of the joint verification experiment (JVE). The technical experts of both countries got together and, within the scope of the bilateral negotiations for a new protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, led heated discussions about the results of two underground nuclear explosions - one in August on the Nevada Test Site and the other in September on the Semipalatinsk Test Site. One would think that, if it is a matter of technical results, everything should be clear and unambiguous. However, any technical result is the practical implementation of only one result out of an infinite number of possible results. Only at the beginning of this century did mankind timidly penetrate into the depth of the structure of the universe and the atom. And there it was faced with a situation which did not fall within the usual framework of deterministic everyday life, and not only everyday life - even the foresight of the outstanding philosophers and fantasists failed to grasp the whole complexity and interactions of the micro- and macro-worlds of the universe. Let's take the nuclear explosion as an example: no matter how accurate is the theory, the mathematical model to be precise, the realities always differ from the theory, and diagnostics and theoretical models always introduce an uncertainty at any level of the experiment. In one word, sometimes bilateral debates lasted till late at night.

    But in return, on Saturdays and Sundays we could enjoy the splendid Alpine grasslands and Lake Geneva to our heart's content. Quite recently we would not even have such a fantastic dream on the test sites. The world has changed irreversibly but it has been a long way! There will be a lot of hurdles on this way in the future but the most important thing is to make the first step towards each other.

The JVE command post on the Nevada Test Site, 1988
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    Incidentally, it was not until 1987 that I went abroad for the first time. That time I went to the GDR. Of course I dreamed of seeing how people lived and worked in other countries, especially my colleagues on the Nevada Test Site. My dream came true in 1988 at the time of the joint experiment in the verification of underground nuclear tests, when I lived on the Nevada Test Site in the United States for almost two months. I remember one private conversation I had with the head of enterprise security service. When I told him about my dream of seeing how the American test engineers did their work, he replied: 'You belong in Kolyma, not abroad. You know too much.' I said: 'I am a Russian and I will serve time in Kolyma, if I have to, but I certainly will return and will not forgive anything!'

    The Joint Verification Experiment was conducted to develop more precise methods of monitoring the yield of underground nuclear explosions in the United States and the USSR. It was a unique event in the postwar history of the two countries. We spent several months with American scientists before and during the two tests on the Nevada and Semipalatinsk Test Sites. Their seismic signals circled our planet, like the harbinger of a new era in mankind's journey to a nuclear-free world. It was a signal of hope.

At the Russian control and measuring facility on the Nevada Test Site, August 1988
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    That was a tangible and joint contribution of the scientists from the two countries to the great cause of the twentieth century, the cause of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation. Direct contacts between the scientists were so important in this process. When we walked around Washington, New York and Las Vegas, I could not imagine, even in a flight of scientific and technical fancy, those wondrous cities as 'military targets'. Sometimes, those thoughts simply terrified me and made me shudder. Yes, it is communication and more communication that will bring the people of our planet together. In the presence of so many nuclear weapons, peace is as fragile as an ice-floe in spring - one careless move and it will shatter. We all applaud the steps of the two great powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. There are still many political whirlpools and submerged rocks on the way to this. I am certain that the main result of the Joint Verification Experiment was not the development of procedures and extent of nuclear test monitoring of the joint development of technical verification means, but the chance for interpersonal communication with the American nuclear physicists. All of us are children of the earth, children of the one Creator of the beautiful and infinite world in which our life is only an instant in eternity.

    Once again fate had given me a gift - my meeting with the American scientists and testers. We were separated only by the language barrier. In contrast to our test site on Novaya Zemlya, the Nevada Test Site has a marvellous swimming pool and a restaurant. Frankly, it would be very difficult even to compare our living conditions. In every other respect, a test site is a test site, and the atmosphere there is one of order, precision and responsibility. We adapted quickly to the harsh climate of Nevada, and our American colleagues enlivened our stay with weekend trips to Las Vegas. The city makes an indelible impression in the daytime and at night. I think of it as a pearl of the State of Nevada. The temperature sometimes rose as high as 50 degrees Celsius in the shade, and the blue sky was absolutely cloudless. In my heart I had the greatest admiration for the pioneers who tamed the 'Wild West' two hundred years ago. That took real courage! It rained only once during the two summer months, but what a storm it was - continuous torrential rail, with powerful and brilliant flashes of lightning almost every minute. It was as if hell had come to earth. Then the sun shone brightly again, and in the distance we could see the glow of a fire. The lightning had started a fire in the beautiful pine forest in the mountains.

At the borehole cap during JVE on the Nevada Test Site
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    As I looked at the glow of that fire, I remembered the year of 1941, when my mother, my younger and elder sisters, and I had left the city of Kalinin and were walking north along a dusty road in the stream of refugees from the occupied territories. We went about 100 kilometres, sometimes on foot and sometimes riding in a cart, and the glow from the fires in the city was still visible at night. The sight of it frightened us because it looked as if our whole native land was burning. The peasants were not that eager to let the refugees spend the night in their homes, so we usually tried to make ourselves comfortable in an abandoned shed for the night and lived on the remains of vegetable gardens. Sometimes we found a potato or a cabbage root, and sometimes we even got a piece of bread or the discarded entrails of slaughtered livestock from the peasants. For some reason, I remember most vividly one face from this human stream of refugees - an old man who was walking near us the whole time. He had a small knapsack on his back and a hunting knife and his eyes - the stem visage of an old soldier - conveying the knowledge that the war would be brutal and heartless. Of course, I did not know yet that the war would leave such a terrible scar on the life of our generation.

    We finally got to the station in Malyshevo, where my mother's sister lived. This small station on the railroad from Bologoye to Yaroslavl was a safe and pleasant comer of Russia. That was the birthplace of my parents and their ancestors - the Karelians who lived there in the village Gorodok.

In the White House before returning home, August 1988
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    I did not go back to Kalinin until the summer of 1942, when I saw the wreckage of the city. Our house had burned down, and we had to live in one small room. I will remember the stem and terrible face of war until the day I die, and God forbid that my grandchildren should have to see it. The oldest is already fourteen.

    Yes, I did everything I could to prevent a repetition of the tragedy of war in our land, to keep the temptation to repeat the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on our planet from entering from anyone's mind, even the most reckless.

    Waiting for our flight to the Nevada Test Site, I felt that I was a lucky man whose dream was about to come true. So many nights I had spent on our nuclear test sites wondering how my American colleagues lived and worked. I was as excited as I had been in my youth when I was waiting for a date with a young girl. My dream had come true.

    I was interviewed for the first time before the joint experiment. Today the interview seems to be full of technical details, but it is an accurate portrayal of the mood of our whole group when we left for America. (Abridged translation from Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 June 1988)

    Q : What is the Joint Verification Experiment and why is it being conducted?

    A : The Joint Verification Experiment, or what we refer to as the JVE, is an integral part of the comprehensive Soviet-American talks on nuclear tests. The agreement to conduct the experiment was concluded last September. As the first step in the process, the USSR and the United States are supposed to agree on better means of verifying the compliance with the so-called 'threshold' treaties - on the limitation of underground nuclear tests of 1974 and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes of 1976. The negotiations also have a mandate to reach an agreement on further restrictions on nuclear tests on the way to the final goal - their complete cessation.

American and Soviet specialists on the Semiplatinsk Test Site, September 1988 (1)
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    I want to remind you that the agreements which set the permissible limit of 150 kilotons on the yield of nuclear blasts had never gone into force because the American Administration felt that the verification measures were inadequate.

    The purpose of the JVE, in brief, is to see which of the improved verification methods should be used to monitor the compliance with the agreements of 1974. We feel that the teleseismic method, which does not require the presence of personnel on the test site to take the measurements, is completely effective and adequate. The United States, on the other hand, is insisting on the so-called hydrodynamic method, which requires that measurements be taken directly on the site.

    The JVE will take the discussion of this problem from the level of theory to the level of actual practice, will demonstrate the effectiveness, applicability and convenience of the proposed methods, and, thereby, will serve as the basis for decision-making.

    Q : Can you tell us more about the teleseismic and hydrodynamic methods of measuring the yield?

American and Soviet specialists on the Semiplatinsk Test Site, September 1988 (2)
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    A: The teleseismic measurement of the yield of underground nuclear explosions is based on records of the amplitude of elastic vibrations in the ground at a distance of 3,000-10,000 kilometres from the site of the explosion. It provides a sufficiently reliable record of the blasts with a yield of several kilotons in virtually any spot on the globe. We feel that this method provides for completely efficient verification of the compliance with the Treaty of 1974. The JVE and the related projects will allow to use the teleseismic method with even greater accuracy in the future. One important advantage of this method - in contrast to the hydrodynamic one - is the possibility to monitor the blasts with an extreme low yield. This was corroborated when an experiment was conducted recently by scientists from the USSR and the United States on the grounds of the Semipalatinsk and Nevada sites with conventional explosives.

    Seismic equipment has undergone a speedy development and improvement in recent years. Today we are considering the establishment of international seismic data centres in several countries (in Moscow, USSR and in Washington, DC in the USA, in Stockholm, Sweden and in Canberra, Australia). A wide-scale exchange of seismic data in combination with international monitoring will create the necessary objective conditions for progress in the curtailment of underground tests of nuclear weapons.

    As to the hydrodynamic method of measuring the yield of an underground nuclear explosion, it is based on the recording of the location of the front of a strong shock wave, which travels through the ground at supersonic speeds, at distances of 10-15 metres from the nuclear device. As a result of a blast of 100-150 kilotons, the hard soil within the area of the strong shock-wave, including the rock, acts like liquid, and that is why the method is called 'hydrodynamic'.

    With the hydrodynamic method, one can take measurements of the yield of an explosion within the main emplacement borehole. If the canister with the nuclear warhead is of small dimensions and was built without the use of any special measures to distort the yield, the measurements can be sufficiently accurate, but in this case there is a high probability of the disclosure of extremely sensitive information about the nuclear weapon. If the canister is of large dimensions, the measurements can be seriously distorted. In general, the American tests are conducted with the use of these large canisters.

    Another option is to conduct the measurements in a specially drilled satellite measurement hole of small diameter, which should be located within 10-15 metres of the main emplacement hole. In this case the dimensions of the canister are less likely to affect the accuracy of the results (although the range of error will still be considerable if special means of camouflage are used). This reduces, but does not completely exclude, the possibility of the disclosure of information with no direct relationship to the yield of the blast. Furthermore, the procedure is much more expensive and requires a lengthy period of preparations - three or four months - before each explosion to be verified. At best, the accuracy of the measurements is the same as in the seismic procedure.

    Q : How will the experiment be conducted?

    A : The procedures of the joint experiment were defined in the statement of the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State of 9 December 1987 and the USSR-USA Agreement on the Joint Experiment, which was signed on 31 May this year at the fourth Soviet-American summit meeting. This agreement covers a broad range of issues connected with the drilling of boreholes, their dimensions, soil sampling, location of the equipment, data exchange, transfer of the equipment and personnel to the test sites in the two countries, working conditions on the test sites, and so forth.

    Two tests will be conducted within the confines of the experiment: one on the Semipalatinsk Test Site and the other in Nevada. They should have a yield of close to 150 kilotons and at least 100 kilotons. Both sides will have a chance, on the basis of complete mutuality, to measure the yield using the teleseismic and hydrodynamic methods.

    Each side will perform teleseismic measurements of the two blasts in the joint experiment with the aid of its own national network of seismic stations. This will start with the preliminary exchange of the required data on the last five years on the sites of each side, and on their recording by five specific seismic stations, as well as information about these stations and conditions on the test sites.

    The hydrodynamic measurements on each test site will be conducted in the emplacement holes and in satellite holes. The sides agreed that the control figure in the experiment will be the measurement taken by the hydrodynamic method in the emplacement hole. The experiment should be conducted in such a way as to guarantee a maximum accuracy of the control measurements. In general, however, the conditions of the experiment in Nevada will differ considerably from the standard conditions of American Tests.

    The so-called anti-intrusive measures to prevent the disclosure of unrelated information will also le tested and analyzed during the experiment.

    Q : In your discussion of the purpose of the experiment you referred only to the Treaty of 1974, but the statement of 9 December 1987, which you mentioned, refers to two threshold agreements. Can you explain this?

    A : The explanation is that the talks which started last November were conducted to make the preparations for the joint experiment and to draft simultaneously specific agreements on the content of future means of verifying the compliance with both treaties. The two sides decided that there was no need to wait for the outcome of the experiment to agree on improved methods of verifying the compliance with the Treaty of 1976 because the present language of the treaty already stipulates the use of the hydrodynamic method to determine the yield of explosions for peaceful purposes, and there is an understanding on the possibility of its more extensive use. That gave the leaders of the two countries an opportunity to report a substantial progress in the preparation of a new protocol to the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes at the Moscow summit meeting and to ask the delegations to complete their work on the protocol as soon as possible.

    The Treaty of 1974 on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests is a different matter. The existing protocol to this treaty does not specify the use of the hydrodynamic method for verification purposes. The American side, as I already said, is insisting on the use of the method on the test sites. We, however, feel that the complexity and the intrusive potential of hydrodynamics could be more of a problem on the test sites. We can only hope that the joint experiment will help us answer all of the many questions that came up.

    Q : What is the present status of the preparations for the joint experiment on the Semipalatinsk and Nevada Test Sites?

    A : The main (emplacement) and satellite (measurement) holes have already been drilled on both sites. The Soviet specialists observed the drilling and measurement of the satellite hole on the Nevada Test Site. In the interest of accuracy, we agreed that the Americans could also drill the satellite hole on the Semipalatinsk Test Site. The Soviet equipment for the hydrodynamic measurements, which will be located within the blast zone, has already arrived in the United States. At the end of June the sides will exchange complete data on ten last tests (five for each side) to secure the seismic method of measurements. The American hydrodynamic equipment will be shipped to the Semipalatinsk Test in July. The tests have been scheduled for the middle of August in Nevada and the middle of September in this country. After this the two sides will process the measurement results, will conduct an analysis and exchange of seismic data, and will begin developing measures to verify the compliance with the Treaty of 1974. We hope to do this quickly, so that the process of agreement on further intermediate limits on nuclear tests can begin.

    The Soviet specialists are flying to Nevada in an objective frame of mind, and with a sense of confidence, to carry out their duties and to achieve the purposes of the JVE as the first step on a long and arduous journey to a total and universal ban on nuclear tests.

    Now it is almost 1994. All of the nuclear test sites on our planet have been silent for more than a year. The Russian test site has remained silent for more than four years. Many events have taken place since the last nuclear explosion on 24 October 1990 on the Northern Test Site. On that memorial day my article 'Why should the country's nuclear Test Sites remain silent?' was published in Pravda ( Pravda, 24 October 1990, abridged text)
The timing was a coincidence; I had offered the article to several newspapers more than two months before that date. It still seems relevant even today, however, on the road to the establishment of a new Russia. We should take another look at it.

    The existing approximate parity of the USSR and USA nuclear arsenals is the basis of the modem stability in the world and, it can be said, of the nature of political and economic relations.

    Unilateral disarmament of our country is a way towards a US monopoly. Of course, they can appeal to us to do this under the flag of peace on our planet, for the sake of vital interests of mankind. However, any monopoly, especially in such area, is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire world community where the population of nuclear weapon states is about 1.7 billion people, i.e. every seventh inhabitant of our planet. Will we feel ourselves comfortable in such nuclear world? In the not so distant history the USA has already had the nuclear weapons monopoly - in 1945-9. We all recall this time with a heavy heart. The progressive people of the whole planet already at that time understood that such situation might be a way into a deep abyss, and some of them, there is no concealing the fact, have given their lives to help us in this really titanic work on the creation of a nuclear shield of peace. On 29 August 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb, developed under the leadership of I. V. Kurchatov, was tested on the newly established Semipalatinsk Test Site. In the difficult post-war years our nation demonstrated its great intellect and talent to the whole world. That was a real triumph of our people.

    Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has firmly struggled for their complete prohibition, starting with 1946 when our country made a proposal in the United Nations Organisation on a complete ban on atomic weapons.

    Here are some milestones in the history of the limitation of nuclear tests.

    In 1963, owing to great efforts of the Soviet Union, the USSR, USA and Great Britain signed in Moscow the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. At the present time, 115 countries adhered to the Treaty. The Moscow Treaty was a decisive step towards improvement and normalisation of the ecological situation on our planet. The transfer to underground tests of nuclear weapons decreased the after-effects of nuclear tests several hundred thousand times. And this step was welcomed by the whole world.

    After the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty our country continued to struggle persistently for a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. As a result, eleven years later and again in Moscow, the USSR and USA signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The Treaty limits the yield of underground nuclear weapon tests with 150 kilotons of TNT equivalent. However, the US side did not ratify the Threshold Treaty of 1974 for over sixteen years owing to its stand on the issue of verification measures. In spite of the fact that the Treaty did not entered into force, the Soviet Union observed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty for all those years and conducted its nuclear tests without a 'genuine' nuclear explosion.

    Last June the Presidents of the USA and our country signed the Protocol to the Treaty of 1974. This Protocol entitles the Verifying Party to use the hydrodynamic measurement method if the planned yield of the explosion exceeds 50 kilotons in addition to the available national technical means and to conduct an on-site inspection if the yield is equal to or lower than 35 kilotons; it also gives a right to use three designated seismic stations on the territory of the Testing Party. In addition to the above rights, for the purposes of building confidence and improving national technical means of verification, the Verifying Party has the right to use, in each of the five calendar years, the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to two tests of the other Party, even if the Testing Party does not conduct tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons. It took only three years of bilateral negotiations in Geneva to elaborate this Protocol which is unprecedented in terms of the depth and scope of technical verification procedures. It should be noted in this connection that while the initial Protocol to the Threshold Treaty encompassed only national technical means of verification and, therefore, was open for signing by other countries, the new Protocol is doomed to remain bilateral because it envisages the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method on the site of explosion, and it was the USA that insisted on the inclusion of this provision as a condition for signing the new Protocol. It cannot but worry us, taking into account incessant nuclear tests of other countries, primarily France and China.

    Nevertheless, an important step was made in the issue of nuclear tests limitation, and primarily through the efforts of the USSR. The most important outcome of these negotiations is the openness of professional discussions of many scientific problems as well as mutual understanding of scientific and technical aspects of verification of the compliance with nuclear test limitations.

    Joint verification experiment (JVE) was the basis of the progress at the negotiations in Geneva. Nuclear tests were conducted on the Nevada and Semipalatinsk Test Sites within the scope of the experiment. For the first time in the history of two countries they evaluated jointly many technical aspects of explosion yield verification methods, including, and this is of prime importance, anti-intrusive techniques of the hydrodynamic method which exclude the acquisition of information about nuclear weapon design during verification. The joint development of anti-intrusive devices and control systems for the instrumentation used for the purposes of the Threshold Treaty is near completion and is a vivid example of the contribution of the scientists of both countries to the limitation of nuclear tests. Joint calibration of the national seismic means of verification of nuclear test yield was one of the principal results of the JVE. Unfortunately, the JVE results have not been yet made accessible to other countries owing to the US stand on the publication of these results.

    Both in Nevada and in Semipalatinsk, the Soviet specialists received the full planned volume of information on nuclear explosions. At the meeting with the US specialists after the JVE I said: 'I hope that a high level of diagnostic equipment used as well as the professional knowledge displayed by the Soviet specialists in this unique experiment show the American scientists that it would be better for us to compete in the building of an environment of mutual understanding and trust rather than in the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons. These two explosions were really a signal of hope on the way towards a nuclear-free world.' I have not met a single Soviet professional who would not welcome these steps, being fully aware of the destructive power of these weapons.

    We are sure that in the nearest future the Treaty of 1974 and the Protocol thereto will enter into force. In September the US Senate unanimously ratified the Treaty with the new Protocol. On 4 October the Committee for International Affairs and the Committee for Defence and State Security of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in their joint session recommended the Supreme Soviet to ratify them. Unfortunately, the specialists of the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry were not invited to the session - after all an important issue was on the agenda and it is the duty of the deputies to their people to listen to a competent opinion. On 9 October the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously ratified the Treaty of 1974. Further progress in the limitation of nuclear tests completely depends on the position of the USA in this issue because there are all preconditions for developing, without delay, the achieved progress and, primarily, in the area of numeric reduction of nuclear weapon tests. The transfer to the numeric reduction of nuclear tests is a qualitatively new step which requires that the notion of a genuine nuclear explosion should be defined for this type of weapons.

    The mechanisms of verification of the number of nuclear explosions can be implemented, and this is very important, on a wide international basis through integration of national control means and on-site inspections.

Geneva - Bilateral negotiations on the transfer of verification instrumentation 1990
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    At the present time, the termination of all nuclear tests is of principal importance for preventing the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons or the so called directed energy weapons, for preventing the release of an evil 'jinn' from the research stage to a full-scale development stage. On the one hand, these weapons should result in a one hundred to one thousand times lower global radioactive contamination as compared with the existing weapons and, on the other hand, they should be capable of killing strategic targets of an adversary both in outer space and on earth. It is precisely this fact that gives rise to concern because some hotheads might be tempted into using them in any local conflict.

    In this connection, there are apprehensions that the second generation of nuclear weapons might be eliminated under the strictest international control on the basis of relevant agreements but in line with a progress of the West in the development of the third generation of nuclear weapons. It is very dangerous to neglect such a course of events. To prevent the creation of the third generation of nuclear weapons is a responsible objective of mankind.

    More and more people in the world support the demand for a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests; on the other hand, there is a rather serious opposition of the nuclear weapon states of the West. Today, the international discussions of this problem are more persistent than ever. The Soviet Union advocated and continues to advocate, within the scope of its new doctrine of dense sufficiency, an immediate and complete ban on all nuclear tests. And it is no fault of the Soviet Union that nuclear tests are still going on. In 1985 we declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. In 1986 our leader M. S. Gorbachev presented a programme for establishing a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. However, our appeal was not heard in the USA where during our moratorium 26 underground nuclear explosions were conducted, including those for the purpose of developing the third generation of nuclear weapons, weapons which are based on new physical principles.

    In 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted an appeal To the US Congress on the Issues of Nuclear Tests Moratorium and on Termination of Nuclear Tests'. There is still no answer from the Congress.

    All in all the Soviet Union conducted 714 nuclear tests, including 499 underground tests after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963. As of today, according to the open publications and refined data of our national verification means, the USA conducted about 1080 nuclear explosions in all, including 750 underground tests after 1963, France conducted 180 explosions, England 42, and China 34.

    Our country has two nuclear test sites - Semipalatinsk Test Site which was founded in 1948 in Kazakhstan and Northern Test Site in the islands of Novaya Zemlya which was founded in 1954. 467 nuclear explosions were conducted in Kazakhstan, including 343 underground nuclear explosions after 1963, and 131 nuclear explosions were conducted on the Northern Test Site, including 41 underground explosions after 1963.

    Since 1963 115 underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were conducted relatively deep underground and were of relatively low yield, including those for creating underground reservoirs, for extinguishing fires at gas wells, for enhancing the discharge of oil wells and for probing the earth's crust on our territory for the purposes of large-scale prospecting of mineral resources.

    112 nuclear weapon tests were conducted within the last ten years from 1981 to 1990 on the test sites of our country and 157 tests in the USA on the Nevada Test Site. Within the same period of time we conducted 43 nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in various regions of the country upon request from the USSR Ministry of Geology, USSR Ministry of Petroleum Industry and USSR Ministry of Gas Industry. The results of these events are published.

    Does the Soviet Union need two nuclear test sites now? I don't think so, taking into account the positive world trends. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR should state its position on the lifetime of nuclear test sites, taking into account the geographical position and geological structure of the test sites as well as the density of the nearby population; on the principles of providing compensation for the risk of residence in these regions, and for the allocation of land for the test sites. However, the solution of such a complex problem is delayed while confusion and embarrassment lead this problem to a deadlock. I believe that, first of all, nuclear weapon testing should cease at the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

    Decision on annual nuclear programmes of the country, including nuclear weapon testing programme, should be made by a special commission of the Committee for Defence and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet, subject to approval by the President of the USSR.

    Since October 1989 our test sites still remain silent while the Nevada Test Site continues its operations. True, the intensity of its operations has slightly decreased but I should say that it is still at a sufficiently high level. For the last five years our test sites remained silent for practically half of this period. Within this period - from 1986 to 1990 - the USSR conducted 43 nuclear weapon tests on its test sites while the USA made 64 tests in Nevada. So the USA has always been ahead of the USSR in terms of the number of nuclear explosions. Of prime importance here however are the interests of national security and not the 'competition'.

    Peremptory statements of our public figures over the radio, television and in mass media as well as meetings and rallies of public organisations for the termination of nuclear tests in our country create a public opinion on the necessity of further unilateral steps in this area.

    There is no doubt that a majority of the seekers have very sincere intentions to save mankind from a nuclear disaster. However, in our country the centre of struggle for a universal nuclear disarmament has recently shifted abruptly towards actual unilateral nuclear disarmament. Can our country allow itself to become a hostage of the political ambitions of other nuclear weapon states? Because today, should we take into account all after-effects of the use of nuclear weapons, they are primarily a weapon of global policy. The voice of professionals is drowned in a chorus of public interpreters of the issues in the area where competence and caution are of special importance. The mass media do not actually give the floor to specialists-professionals, and very often give open libel; invention and demagogic statements remain unanswered. Incidentally we all remember a flow of statements in the press under the slogan 'Whose bread are you eating, academician Sakharov?' We are ashamed to remember it now and I can be answered that the campaign took place in the times of 'stagnation'. No, history repeats itself. As a rule, the alternative points of view are not given the floor. The 'occupation' of the mass media might be fraught with incommensurable misfortunes for our country.

    Under these conditions, the unpreparedness of the public for an objective assimilation of information about the nature and characteristic features of radioactive and seismic situations, the unawareness of safety measures undertaken as well as of the difficult living conditions, very often result in an outburst of emotions as regards the nuclear test sites of the country. It is worth noting in this connection that the JVE on the Semipalatinsk Test Site, where Soviet and foreign mass media were widely represented, shows that the Soviet specialists ensure a level of safety of underground nuclear explosions which is not inferior to that in the USA and, as regards the costs of nuclear explosions, such expenses are several dozens of times lower as compared with the USA. And the realities show that expenditures of the US Department of Energy for the nuclear weapons complex grow every year by 8-10% as similar expenses in our country decrease by 15%. Such is the reality which our teams have to work in. By the way. Soviet journalists did not arrive at the American JVE explosion in Nevada though they were officially invited. There is a situation in our country when any criticism against the Soviet test sites is considered to be a manifestation of patriotism and progressiveness. And as always happens in such cases, a number of public figures use the situation for improving their popularity and very often play the role of directors and script writers of such mass actions.

    Meanwhile, the USA and its NATO allies continue to improve their nuclear arsenal. They are considering a long-term programme of modernisation of the facilities related to the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. New and advanced forms of control over the military-industrial complex are being elaborated. The long-term programme places a special emphasis on the assurance of safety, reliability and efficiency of nuclear weapons in the next twenty years.

    Enhancement of nuclear weapon safety in case of emergency or unauthorised access is viewed as one of the basic requirements for the improvement of nuclear weapons, taking into account the fact that they contain radioactive materials such as plutonium, uranium and thorium. At the present time, underground nuclear tests represent a top priority experimental research and engineering programme aimed at improving and developing new types of nuclear weapons.

    The West is undertaking intensive efforts to improve the target killing accuracy of nuclear REV warheads; to develop weapons of high survivability under conditions of countermissile and cosmic space weapon defences as well as weapons for killing buried targets. And here we are speaking about the first-strike weapons! It is taking place in a time when, in contrast to our country, the NATO member-states have not made a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons!

    It should be noted that the US Senate gave its consent last September to ratify the Threshold Treaty of 1974 subject: primarily, to guarantee implementation of efficient and continuous programmes of underground nuclear weapon tests and maintenance of modem nuclear laboratories and programmes for ensuring continuous progress of nuclear engineering.

    Can the test sites of our country remain silent under such conditions? Only a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests can prevent a new spiral of arms race and put an end to an infinite improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    We all seek to put our own house in order. However, not everything is OK so far. There are a lot of examples of the latter at every step. We are not alone on this planet, we all live in a complicated and dynamic world. In the age of nuclear and space technology time and space are compressed to the utmost for everyone.

    There are still many regions in the world with unstable political situations, extremism and aggressiveness, including those which are directly at our borders. Certain 'third world countries' are undertaking intensive efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, the nuclear weapon capability, which was created when times were difficult for our country, and continuous maintenance of this capability at a modem scientific and technical level, are a guarantee of stable peace on our planet and, I would say, a guarantee of success of new political attitudes during negotiations on equal terms for mutual limitation and termination of nuclear tests. It is not a matter of the number of missiles with nuclear warheads but a matter of scientific and technical potential which can flexibly respond to possible achievements of other countries in this area.

    By reducing nuclear weapons, we can save incommensurably more resources for the needs of our national economy as compared to a unilateral ban on nuclear tests - the basis of scientific, technical and military potential of our country - until we achieve a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. It is much more difficult to prevent the degradation of the unique teams of highly skilled professionals than to destruct them. It is much simpler now, taking into account the most complicated social and economic situation, to demand unilateral steps from our country. Were the post-war years, when we were setting up our nuclear industry, really easier for us? Frankly speaking, even today, despite the existing atmosphere around nuclear test sites and nuclear tests, civic courage is required for maintaining high responsibility and high patriotism, and for not giving way to the temptation of ephemeral benefits for the teams of workers, engineers and scientists while solving the problem of the maintenance of nuclear parity at all stages of disarmament.

    The nuclear weapons complex of our country is the property of the whole people and it is impossible to divide the complex into separate pieces because it will prove to be a disaster for all nations.

    I am sure that our people will understand and will overcome the difficulties of the present stage. And in conclusion, using a well-known appeal, I would like to say: 'Dear compatriots, be vigilant!'

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