Russia's foreign policy has always been based on a major principle - the maximisation of good relations with its close neighbours. History shows that this principle has only been violated when a third party intervened. As a rule, an outsider has sought to benefit from aggravating the situation on a Russian border.

    This applies completely to relations between Russia and Iran. These states developed mutually beneficial and neighbourly relations both before and after the Revolution of 1971. Russia's assistance involved the construction of railroads, mining, and industrial construction. After 1917, during the first exodus of immigrants from Russia, many of them gained considerable property in Iran and became permanent residents. Cooperation between the two countries continued throughout the difficult years of World War II. It was no coincidence that Joseph Stalin proposed Tehran as the venue of a meeting of the heads of state of the anti-Hitler coalition.

    After the war, particularly under Shakh Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, tensions arose in the relations between the USSR and Iran. However, these depended much on the relations between the USSR and the USA and on the latter's influence on the Shakh's foreign policy.

    Using the Shakh's ambitions for great power to its advantage, the USA succeeded in turning Iran into the chief guardian of its oil-related interests in the Persian Gi'f and Indian Ocean. Iran became an outpost in the struggle in the Middle East between the USSR and the USA with its allied Western states. The United States supplied Iran with state-of-the-art weaponry and a great number of military advisers. A technical intelligence network, for the surveillance of the USSR's nuclear arsenal, was spread over Iran's territory. Of course, this brought about natural resentment on the part of our country.

    The Shakh attempted to prolong the period during which Iran would retain the role of a major oil-producing country and the world's leading oil supplier. To this end, Iran enjoyed the assistance of Western states, mostly the USA, in developing its comprehensive nuclear energy programme. The programme envisaged the construction of 23 nuclear power units, a radiochemical plant to produce plutonium, experimental nuclear reactors, an infrastructure to ensure the functioning of nuclear facilities, and personnel training programmes, including the training of highly qualified specialists in Western colleges, especially in the USA and West Germany.

    The programme to retrofit Iran's energy sector with nuclear-powered plants was supported by the USA and a number of Western countries. Accounting for the fact that Iran had become a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Union treated Iran's plans for peaceful use of nuclear energy with understanding.

    In the mid 1970s, Iran began to implement a programme to diversify its energy sector. Those were hectic times for the Shah, who struggled to find time for the negotiations and orders for nuclear units placed with US, Canadian, German, and other foreign firms. However, he did remember to replenish Iran's stock of weaponry with modem armaments from American arsenals.

    At that time Siemens of Germany began to construct two nuclear units, each with a capacity of 1.2 MW, on the coast of the Persian Gulf near the town of Bushehr. The construction proceeded smoothly. According to Iranian experts, by the end of 1979, the percentage of work completed on the nuclear units was 85 per cent and 65 per cent, respectively. But in 1979 the construction was stopped under the German government's decision, and the German specialists were withdrawn. Iran entered a time of radical revolutionary changes under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic revolution that brought down the 2,500-year-old monarchy was caused by several factors, including the militarisation of the economy, the corruption of officials, the unceremonious invasion and propagation of Western culture with its loose morals, the growing crime rate, and the unmannerly and overly permissive ways of foreigners.

    Communism was also nipped in the bud, because it was thought that the danger for Iran came not only from the USA, but also from the atheist Soviet Union. Meanwhile, it was considered to be a correct principle that in struggling against one superpower Iran should not seek support from the other.

    The fratricidal Iranian-Iraqi war, unleashed as a result of provocation by 'third party' countries, seemed to have completely foiled the plans to upgrade Iran's energy sector. Iraq bombed Iran's strategic industrial sites, including the nuclear units by Bushehr.

    In the meantime, the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran with the United States were approaching a crisis point. The United States undermined its position in Iran for a long time when it used the capture of American Embassy personnel as a pretext to send a large naval task force to the Persian Gulf, having declared it to be a sphere of US vital interests, and made almost no secret about preparations for a military coup.

    At the same time, the relations with USSR, which had begun to restructure its economy, steadily improved. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, said that "Russia is not only an Orthodox country; it is one-third Moslem. It is our duty and obligation to leam to live in friendship with the Moslem world."

    In June 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ali Akbar Hashemi Raf-sanjani signed the Programme of Long-term Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran until the Year 2000. The programme aimed to expand cooperation in the mutually advantageous use of natural resources and energy sources; construction and expansion of industrial facilities; transfer of technologies, developments, and patents/licences; and bilateral trade. It is stated in the programme that, 'accounting for the mutual desire of both sides to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including research, technologies, and use of nuclear energy,' the parties agreed to instruct the competent organisations of the two countries to conduct negotiations on cooperation, and draw up a corresponding agreement as well as other documents.

    The long-term programme called for working up a basic document, and signing the two major inter-govemmental agreements: The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Cooperation in Construction of a Nuclear Plant on the Territory of Iran. We signed these documents with a view to the fact that Iran was one of the first countries that signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is an IAEA member which put its nuclear industry under the IAEA guarantees in 1973. Iran granted the right to IAEA to inspect any facility on its territory without prior notice. A number of such inspections have proven that Iran's nuclear industry has pursued exclusively peaceful goals.

    Iran is successfully operating two experimental nuclear reactors and nuclear units built by Western countries in the seventies and serviced by personnel who were trained in the USA and Western Europe.

    Both agreements were signed on 25 August 1992. They envisaged that 'cooperation, as a goal of these agreements, serves the purpose of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and is implemented in accordance with both parties' obligations as stipulated in the Treaty On Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons dated 1 July 1968.' The agreements state that nuclear and non-nuclear materials and nuclear-related equipment should:

• not be used for the production of nuclear arms or other nuclear explosive devices and any military purposes;
  
  
• be placed under the IAEA guarantees during the entire period of their practical use;
  
  
• be provided with security measures at a level not below the one recommended by the IAEA.

    The organisations responsible for the implementation of the agreement are as follows:

• on behalf of the Russian Federation: Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy;
  
  
• on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Iran's Nuclear Energy Organisation.

    An important condition of the agreements is the provision stipulating that even in case of cancellation, the above stated obligations related to the Treaty On Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be valid until the date of a new agreement.

    The agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy envisages the following fields of such cooperation:

1. Fundamental and applied research in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
   
   
2. Research, design and training.
   
   
3. R&D and applied research on nuclear plant safety, operational experience, and monitoring and support systems.
   
   
4. Radiological protection and nuclear safety.
   
   
5. Production of radio isotopes and the use thereof.
   
   
6. Fuel cycles and ecology.
   
   
7. Design, construction, and operation of nuclear research and energy reactors.
   
   
8. Industrial production of components and materials for nuclear reactors and their fuel cycles.
   
   
9. Decommissioning, deactivation, and treatment of nuclear fuel waste.
   
   
10. Research in controlled fusion.
    
    
11. Research in laser technology and use of lasers.
    
    
12. Other technological aspects of peaceful use of nuclear energy which the parties may consider of mutual interest.

    It is envisaged that the cooperation will be effected through various means: consultations on research and technologies, the formation of joint working groups to implement both special developments and projects for the purpose of research work and technological studies, and the exchange of scientific and technical information, documentation, and the results of research. It will also be supported by separate agreements and contracts that specify the conditions, general rights and obligations of the participating organisations and that set the scope, costs, terms and other particulars of projects being implemented.

    The Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy is currently at the initial stage of realisation. Negotiations are under way to identify mutual interests and study the partners' terms and potentials.

    For example, at the meeting between Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Iran's Nuclear Energy Organisation in Tehran in January 1995, the parties discussed the issue of a research centre in Iran with an experimental reactor as one of its components. The Russians are ready to deliver and assemble such a reactor. This will be a light-water reactor, using non-military uranium for fuel. Clearly, Iran will need well-qualified research and technical personnel to ensure safe operation of Russian-built nuclear facilities. To this end the Ministry of Nuclear Energy is ready to provide the necessary training for Iranian specialists.

    'Aside from that, a decision was made to conduct negotiations regarding assistance in the development of a uranium deposit in the near future. The basic survey work has already been completed by Chinese experts. The assistance will consist of preparation of project design documents to build a mine and an ore-dressing works to enrich uranium. These activities are characteristic of all countries which have uranium resources, regardless of whether or not they have a nuclear programme.

    At the meeting, the parties discussed cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle. The Russians demonstrated the understanding of Iran's desire to have its own isotope production, with modem technologies supplied by Russia, and stated that negotiations on this issue are possible. However, the Iranians were informed that the construction of this facility will take time, being dependent on the building of the nuclear plant and the uranium mine. These contacts displayed openness in cooperation towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is the basis for the establishment of trade and economic cooperation by the new Russia.

    Of course, all the current negotiations between the Russian and Iranian specialists are recorded in the Protocols of Negotiations. But so far, no binding documents or contracts have been signed which would implement the agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    In concluding the agreement on cooperation in the construction of a nuclear plant on Iran's territory, the parties proceeded from the mutual desire to further develop existing neighbourly relations, as well as the understanding of the necessity and benefits of the use of nuclear energy by Russia and Iran in the future. It is stated in the Agreement that the governments of Russia and Iran will cooperate in a turn-key project for building and operating a nuclear plant on Iran's territory. The plant will consist of two (with a possibility of adding two more) power units of average capacity, with light-water cooling and moderated reactors (VVER). The Agreement stipulated that Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy was fully responsible for the construction site to the norms, standards and rules accepted in the Russian Federation. The Iranian side suggested a site located on the coast of the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. However, this site was rejected after geological and seismic surveys. Then Iran suggested that construction at the Bu-shehr site be resumed and completed.

    Following the positive results of geological surveys, and acceptance of the Iranian side's offer, Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy approached Germany's Ministry of Trade with a proposal to cooperate in this construction. After the German side rejected the offer to participate in the construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr, we began to work on the construction contract. The contract to complete the construction of the first nuclear unit for the nuclear plant in Bushehr was signed in January 1995 in Iran. It is worth around $800 million. Under the contract, a 1,000 MW light-water cooled and moderated reactor is to be built. The reactor design will be provided by the IAEA, in accordance with the established procedure. The Iranian side made a commitment and guaranteed timely payment for the fulfilment of the written contract when properly completed. Before the agreement came into force, over a hundred specialists of Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy studied the previously built structures and facilities in order to determine how to make the best use of them while building the Russian nuclear unit.

    The signed contract is expected to come into force in September 1995, after amendments are written with regard to the delivery of Russian nuclear fuel to Iran, transportation of used nuclear fuel to Russia for reconditioning, transfer of nuclear waste in glass containers for burial, banking services, and a number of other issues. Considering our mutual aspirations, and the respect developed in the course of working on the contract, we have no doubts whatsoever that the contract will be successfully completed by the designated date.

    Although Russia and Iran signed a contract to complete the construction of one nuclear unit, the parties have agreed in principle to complete the construction of a second Bushehr unit with a 1,000 MW light-water reactor, and to add two more VVER-440 units.

    While conducting negotiations with Iran on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the construction use of nuclear energy and the construction of the nuclear plant, we proceeded from two standpoints: first, our desire to support neighbourly relations with that country, and second, the obligation placed upon Russia as a country with nuclear weapons under Article IV of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The above article excludes the possibility of discrimination against the parties to the Agreement in research, generation, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We understand that Russia must help 'further promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, especially on the territories of the parties to the Agreement which do not have nuclear weapons, with due consideration of the needs of the world's developing regions.' We believe that in order to avoid the Treaty regulations and refuse to cooperate with a party to the Agreement, one should have sound proofs of its ambition to create nuclear arsenals. Therefore, when deciding in favour of cooperation with Iran we accounted for the fact that this non-nuclear country is regarded by IAEA as an exemplary party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and strictly observes its regulations. We gave broad coverage to the negotiations with Iran. And, of course, the signed agreements had no military connotations. Therefore the calm and considerate attitudes displayed by other countries - including the US - towards our 1989 and 1992 agreements with Iran were regarded by Russia as quite natural. So all the more surprising was the USA's immediate dissatisfaction and even protest against the 1995 contract to complete the construction of the Bushehr-1 unit. High ranking officials, congressmen, senators, business people, democrats and republicans, regardless of whether or not they understood the situation, deemed it their duty to recommend or even demand that Russia cancel the agreements with Iran and not implement the contract to complete the Bushehr-1 unit. For example, John D. Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the Clinton administration, stated that the 'United States will insist that Russia drop the plans to supply nuclear reactors to Iran. The US government believes that Russia may fail to stick to its promise to ensure the safety of the nuclear fuel supplied to Iran.'

    William Perry, the US Secretary for Defence, made a strong statement demanding that we cancel our contract with Iran. Speaking in Washington at the leadership conference of the Anti-defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith, a Jewish human rights organisation. Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared: 'Russia's policy towards this [the Bushehr-1 construction contract] and other issues will surely affect its membership in international institutions.' He also said that 'Russia .. . will deeply regret the day it made the decision to cooperate with a terrorist state.' President Clinton repeatedly spoke against the sale of nuclear reactors to Tehran.

    The campaign against Russian-Iranian cooperation in the USA was used by certain circles in our own country. Prominent environmentalists stated that they 'could not sleep' after they learned about the contract to sell the nuclear reactor to Iran. The distress these people experienced can be properly appraised only if you recall that they felt nothing of the kind about the polluted atmosphere of Russian cities, the contaminated rivers and lakes, the rising infant mortality rate, and the decrease in the average age of Russians. Our cooperation is opposed by members of the Social Ecological Union, Green Peace, and other environmental organisations. A number of Duma deputies sent President Yeltsin a petition protesting against Russia's cooperation with Iran in the nuclear energy field. Some of the opponents follow 'market principles' and 'do not rule out the possibility of cancelling the contract - if the USA reimburses the loss.'

    So what arguments against our cooperation with Iran are used by the USA and the Russian 'well-wishers'? They use several. For example, it is stated that the Iranians are a terrorist people, and that therefore nuclear cooperation with such leads to international nuclear terrorism. The absurdity of this idea is obvious, for there are not and never will be 'terrorist nations'.

    The United States asserts that Iran has a programme to create nuclear arms, claiming that its intelligence has necessary proofs to support the statement. However, all the documents given to the Russian specialists do not substantiate this serious charge. Conversely, the information made public by Russia's Intelligence shows that no such activities exist.

    The Clinton administration has other claims against Iran, but none is serious enough to interfere with Iran's intention to develop its nuclear energy sector. The unhealthy reaction of the USA towards the nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran most likely occurred because of two major reasons, which became obvious early in 1995.

    First, this represents a noticeable loss of American influence in the Persian Gulf, a region which continues to be the USA's territory of special interests (America's annual imports of oil from Iran total $4 billion). The issue in question concerns not only nuclear reactors. It involves Russia's growing trade with Iran in IL-114 aircraft., automobiles and motorcycles, the construction of a subway in Tehran, and the sale of submarines and other military hardware to Iran. It is impossible for the USA to stem its loss of influence without changing the 'great power self-awareness' that has become very noticeable in the recent years, along with its feeling of faultless world leadership.

    Second, by 1995 it became obvious that Washington's dream regarding a drastic cut in Russia's nuclear potential will not materialise. While reducing its military component to a reasonable level and maintaining nuclear parity, Russia's nuclear industry succeeded in weathering the critical period of restructuring with minimum losses. It has preserved its scientific and technical potential, started a new development stage, and offered serious competition on the world nuclear technologies market. Clearly, the USA does not like this situation. Recently, this displeasure was publicly voiced by William Perry, who said that 'the Soviet nuclear complex resembles the Hydra - a multiheaded monster from Greek mythology. It is useless to cut off its warheads, for new ones will grow. The monster itself should be destroyed.'

    The struggle for our mutually beneficial, neighbourly relations with Iran and a number of other friendly countries has not ended yet. There will be more difficult and possibly dramatic negotiations.

    The events that followed the signing of the agreements and contracts with Iran on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful goals have shown that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, and other Russian departments join efforts to protect Russia's interests, success is guaranteed.

    By the way of conclusion it should be pointed out that Russia's President Boris Yeltsin, together with Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, played a decisive role in overcoming the unprecedented pressure on our country. After a thorough analysis of the agreements concluded with Iran, they realised their profitability and evaluated all the possible scenarios as to how the security of our country may be affected in the future. Next, they took an unambiguous attitude in favour of the agreements. The support provided by our top leaders shows that Russian has been developing a new foreign economic policy.